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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3919 
___________ 
 
BRAY JIBRIL MURRAY, 
   Appellant 
v. 
 
PAUL A. ENNIS, PROGRAM MANAGER;  
MICHAEL C. BARONE, SUPERINTENDENT;  
EDWARD J. WOJCIK, DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT;  
MAJOR JAMES REED;  
LIEUTENANT  BENSEL; 
LIEUTENANT M. L. NEVLING;  
CAPTAIN  IRELAND;  
LIEUTENANT W. GILL;  
SARGEANT  NICHOLSON;  
MAIL SUPERVISOR D. A. WOODARD;  
BILL C. DOMBROWSKI, UNIT MANAGER;  
CAPTAIN  REPKO 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-08-cv-00264) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 24, 2013 
Before:  FUENTES, VANASKIE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 1, 2013 ) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
PER CURIAM 
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 Bray Jibril Murray appeals pro se from the District Court’s order denying his 
motion for a new trial in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  We will affirm. 
I. 
Because we write for the parties, who are well acquainted with the case, we 
recount only the essential facts and procedural history.  Murray, a Pennsylvania prisoner, 
commenced a pro se § 1983 action in the District Court, naming as defendants 23 current 
and former employees of the State Correctional Institution at Forest (“SCI-Forest”).  
After dismissing several defendants and claims, the District Court held a jury trial on 
Murray’s First Amendment claims against 13 defendants.  The jury found in Murray’s 
favor and awarded nominal damages with respect to one retaliation claim against 
defendant Paul Ennis for placing Murray in administrative custody in response to 
Murray’s filing grievances against SCI-Forest staff.  On all other claims, the jury found in 
favor of the defendants.  Murray moved for a new trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59, and 
separately filed a notice of appeal from the judgment.  The District Court denied 
Murray’s request for a new trial, and shortly thereafter we dismissed his appeal for failure 
to prosecute.  Murray now appeals the District Court’s denial of his new trial motion.  
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s 
denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion unless the District Court’s 
decision is based on the application of a legal precept, in which case our review is 
plenary.  See Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Honeywell, Inc. v. 
American Standards Testing Bureau, Inc., 851 F.2d 652, 655 (3d Cir. 1988)).  Under 
Rule 59(a), a District Court has the discretion to grant a new trial on claims of improper 
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admission of evidence or erroneous jury instructions when it finds that those errors are 
substantial.  See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251 (1940). 
II. 
 Murray primarily argues that the District Court erred with respect to evidentiary 
rulings during trial.  In particular, he asserts that Ennis should not have been allowed to 
testify regarding his knowledge of Murray’s history of violent behavior at previous 
prisons in explaining the decision to place him in administrative custody following a 
disciplinary proceeding at SCI-Forest.  Murray contends that such testimony was not 
relevant and that its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.  We disagree.   
The District Court explained in a pretrial ruling that evidence of Murray’s prior 
bad acts would only be admitted for the limited purpose of rebutting his contention that 
the defendants’ motivation in placing him in administrative custody was retaliatory.  
When Murray objected during Ennis’s testimony, the District Court reminded defense 
counsel of this limitation before permitting the testimony to proceed.  In addition, the 
District Court provided a limiting instruction to the jury.  Under these circumstances, we 
discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s refusal to grant a new trial based on 
its application of the relevancy test set forth in Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), or the balancing test 
embodied in Fed. R. Evid. 403.  See United States v. DeMuro, 677 F.3d 550, 563 (3d Cir. 
2012) (citing United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 886 (3d Cir. 1992)).   
Murray also argues that the District Court erred by allowing into evidence a prison 
misconduct report and related documents detailing his participation in the assault of an 
officer at the State Correctional Institution at Fayette in 2005.  Our review of the record 
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reveals that although the admissibility of the documents Murray identifies in his appellate 
brief was discussed before and during trial, the documents themselves were never 
presented to the jury and therefore could have had no effect on the outcome.  Murray 
further argues that the improper admission of these documents, in addition to the 
references to his prior bad acts in Ennis’s testimony, created a “spillover” effect that 
prejudiced his other claims.  Because Murray raises this argument for the first time on 
appeal, we need not consider it.  See Harris v. City of Phila., 35 F.3d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 
Pa. 1994).  Were we to consider it, we would find it meritless because we discern no error 
in the District Court’s evidentiary rulings, and the “spillover” doctrine Murray cites 
relates to criminal charges.  See United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 178 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 Finally, Murray argues that the District Court improperly instructed the jury with 
respect to deadlock.  During deliberations, the jury advised the Court that it was having 
difficulty reaching a unanimous decision.  In response, the Court provided the jury with 
this Circuit’s model deadlock charge.  See Model Civil Jury Instructions 3.4.  Murray 
argues that the District Court’s instruction was misleading, racially charged, and coerced 
the jury into finding for the defendants on most of his claims.  We discern no abuse of 
discretion in the District Court’s rejection of this argument, as our review of the record 
reveals that the Court did not deviate from the language of the model charge.
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1
 In his new trial motion, Murray pressed additional arguments relating to the District 
Court’s evidentiary rulings and instructions to the jury on other matters, as well as 
whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and whether punitive damages 
were required.  His appellate brief does not dispute the District Court’s rejection of these 
arguments, however, and therefore we need not consider them here.  See Laborers’ Int’l 
Union v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[a]n issue is waived 
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III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s order denying Murray’s motion for 
a new trial is affirmed. 
                                                                                                                                                  
unless a party raises it in its opening brief”).  Were we to consider these arguments, we 
would not find that the District Court abused its discretion in any of the above respects. 
